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Department of State

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Action

1977 APR 22 PM 3 11

Control: 13895

Rec'd:

APRIL 22, 1957 001
11:56 AMEUR
Info

FROM: BONN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 4087, APRIL 22, 3PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

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
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PRIORITY

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WITHIN PAST FEW WEEKS SUBJECT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS HAS COME FROM RELATIVE OBSCURITY TO BE NUMBER ONE TOPIC IN PRESS AND, AT THE MOMENT, IN ELECTION CAMPAIGN. REPERCUSSIONS ARE ALREADY WIDESPREAD AND THREATEN TO GROW IN NUMBER, VARIETY AND SERIOUSNESS. CONFUSING AND CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS ARE BEING MADE IN ABUNDANCE AND IT IS BECOMING DAILY MORE DIFFICULT TO DISENTANGLE SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS FROM ELECTION CAMPAIGN TACTICS. WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ANALYZE BELOW HOW THIS SITUATION AROSE. NECESSARILY SPECULATIVE NATURE OF MUCH OF ANALYSIS MUST BE RECOGNIZED. FOR ANALYTICAL PURPOSES WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DIVIDE DIAGNOSIS INTO TWO PARTS: (A) WHAT MAY BE CALLED THE MORE OBJECTIVE FACTS, AND (B) INFLUENCE OF PERSONALITY OF CHANCELLOR ADENAUER.

(A) ALTHOUGH, LIKE MANY OTHER PEOPLE, GERMANS HAVE LONG BEEN AWARE OF BOTH EXISTENCE AND POTENTIAL HORROR OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEY IN FACT KNOW LITTLE ABOUT THEM AND HAVE GIVEN SUBJECT RELATIVELY LITTLE THOUGHT. THEY HAVE FOR TWELVE YEARS BEEN EXTREMELY BUSY RECOVERING FROM WAR, ORGANIZING A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IN A DIVIDED COUNTRY, GAINING INDEPENDENCE AND RECOGNITION FOR THEIR NEW STATE, AND CREATING ECONOMIC PROSPERITY OUT OF CHAOS. DURING MOST OF THAT TIME THE OCCUPYING POWERS DID MOST OF THE GERMANS' THINKING FOR THEM IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. EVEN BEFORE THEY GOT THEIR SOVEREIGNTY BACK NON-ATOMIC SHAPE OF THEIR FUTURE ARMED FORCES HAD BEEN DECIDED FOR THEM. THEY HAVE ONLY RECENTLY BEGUN TO THINK FOR THEMSELVES. THEY HAVE REMAINED UNAWARE OF EXTENT TO WHICH NATO'S SHIELD FORCES HAVE COME TO DEPEND UPON ATOMIC WEAPONS.

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-2-4087, APRIL 22, 3 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

ALL OF THIS HAS CONTRIBUTED TO A SITUATION WHEREIN THE SUBJECT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND ATOMIC WARFARE HAS BEEN DISCUSSED LITTLE AND IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF RELATIVE PEACE AND QUIET. THREE CURRENT EVENTS HAVE COINCIDED TO HELP DISRUPT THIS PEACE AND QUIET: (1) EARL OF BRANDON'S STATEMENT THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE ATOMIC WEAPONS IN GERMANY, (2) REALIZATION THAT BRITISH MILITARY "NEW LOOK" MEANT INCREASED RELIANCE ON ATOMIC WEAPONS, AND (3) ELECTION CAMPAIGN. OF THESE, LAST IS PROBABLY MOST IMPORTANT. SPD FEEL STRONGLY ON SUBJECT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS; THEY HAVE NOT HAD GOOD CAMPAIGN ISSUE; AND THEY IMMEDIATELY LEAPED UPON THIS ONE. BRITISH "NEW LOOK" ON CONVENTIONAL VERSUS NUCLEAR FORCES RAISED PROBLEM OF EQUALITY FOR GERMANY IN MODERN WEAPONS (ASSISTED BY U.S. OFFER OF IRBM TO UK) AND EARL OF BRANDON'S STATEMENT IS BEST CONSIDERED AS SPARK WHICH SET OFF EXPLOSION, SINCE IN ITSELF IT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO STARTLING.

AS OF MOMENT OF WRITING, IT SEEMS TO US CHANCELLOR HAS STIRRED UP CONTROVERSY UNNECESSARILY BY AGGRESSIVELY STATING AT THIS TIME THAT GERMAN ARMY MUST HAVE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND BY ATTACKING GERMAN PHYSICISTS WHO DISAGREED WITH HIM. THIS LEADS US INTO A FACTOR WHICH IS PROBABLY AS IMPORTANT AS ALL OTHERS PUT TOGETHER: THE PERSONALITY OF GERMAN CHANCELLOR.

(B) IN AN ASSESSMENT OF KONRAD ADENAUER, AT THIS TIME PARTICULARLY, IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND THAT HE IS A STUBBORN AND STRONG-MINDED OLD MAN, THAT HE IS AT ALL TIMES A POLITICIAN, AND THAT THIS IS AN ELECTION YEAR. THESE FACTS TOGETHER WITH SOME RECENT HISTORY HELP TO SOME EXTENT EXPLAIN OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE CONTRADICTIONS WHICH SEEM TO FLOW FROM FEDERAL CHANCELLOR ON GENERAL SUBJECT UNDER DISCUSSION HERE. IN FIRST PLACE (BUT WITHOUT REPEATING ENTIRE ANALYSIS PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED THIS SUBJECT), WE MUST POINT OUT THAT CHANCELLOR IS STILL VERY SENSITIVE TO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF "RADFORD PLAN" INCIDENT OF LAST SUMMER. HE WAS AFRAID THAT UNITED STATES WAS GOING TO WITHDRAW LARGE NUMBER OF TROOPS FROM GERMANY AND SUBSTITUTE THEREFORE AN INCREASING NUMBER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HIS FEAR HAS TWO BASES:

(1) HE HAD

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-3-4087, APRIL 22, 3 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

(1) HE HAD STAKED SIZEABLE PORTION OF HIS POLITICAL LIFE ON HIS CONTRIBUTION TO NATO OF TWELVE "CONVENTIONAL" DIVISIONS, AND HE HAD FOUGHT FOR THIS CONCEPT AGAINST STRONG OPPOSITON. AS HE SAW IT, RADFORD PLAN MADE HIM LOOK SILLY -NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT APPEARED THAT HIS AMERICAN FRIENDS, ON WHOM HE LEANED HEAVILY IN INTERNAL GERMAN POLITICS, HAD LET HIM DOWN BIT ALSO BECAUSE IT LOOKED AS THOUGH RAPIDLY MOVING MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS HAD PASSED HIM BY WITHOUT HIS KNOWING IT -AND HE PROBABLY MADE UP HIS MIND NOT TO BE CAUGHT SHORT THUS AGAIN.

(2) HE FEARED THAT AN INCREASING RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS MADE NUCLEAR WAR MORE LIKELY.

THIS SECOND FEAR HAS CAUSED HIM TO SPEAK AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THE FIRST FEAR, PLUS THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BRITISH FORCE CUTS AND "NEW LOOK", HAVE FORCED HIM TO DEMAND THEM FOR GERMAN ARMED FORCES. THE POLITICIAN IN HIM MAKES IT EASIER FOR HIM TO TALK OUT OF BOTH SIDES OF HIS MOUTH AT THE SAME TIME, AND THE RADFORD PLAN SCARS HAVE MADE THESE VOICES STRIDENT.

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1957 APR 22 PM

Control:

13904

Rec'd:

APRIL 22, 1957 001

12:21 PM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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action

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FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4087, APRIL 22, 3 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO) J-11

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 4087, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 419, PARIS 765.

IN ADDITION TO ABOVE, THERE IS PROBLEM OF GERMAN REARMAMENT TAKING PLACE AT TIME WHEN GREAT POWERS ARE DISCUSSING DISARMAMENT, AND ALSO WHEN SUBJECT OF REUNIFICATION IS BEING DEBATED IN GERMANY. SPD STATE AS THEIR BELIEF THAT MORE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED WITH THE SOVIETS ON REUNIFICATION; THEY ARE LUKEWARM ON GERMAN REARMAMENT; THEY ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ACQUISITION BY GERMAN ARMED FORCES OF ATOMIC WEAPONS; AND THEY BELIEVE GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO IS AN OBSTACLE TO REUNIFICATION. CHANCELLOR CONSIDERS DISARMAMENT MOST IMPORTANT; HE MAKES A DISTINCTION BETWEEN "TACTICAL" ATOMIC WEAPONS, WHICH HE DEMANDS FOR THE GERMAN FORCES, ON THE ONE HAND, AND "LARGE THERMO-NUCLEAR" WEAPONS ON THE OTHER, WHICH HE APPARENTLY WOULD LIKE TO SEE REMOVED FROM NATIONAL ARSENALS. FURTHERMORE, CHANCELLOR MAY FEEL THAT ANY AGREEMENT ON DISARMAMENT PRIOR TO REUNIFICATION WOULD REMOVE SOME OF THE ATTENTION OF HIS ALLIES AND MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT HE IS UNAWARE OF THE CONTRADICTIONS INHERENT IN THE VARIOUS STATEMENTS HE MAKES ON ALL OF THESE SUBJECTS; BUT IT IS JUST AS POSSIBLE THAT HE IS AWARE, TO SOME EXTENT, OF THE CONTRADICTIONS BUT, AS A POLITICIAN, IS NOT BOTHERED BY THEM. IT IS EVEN POSSIBLE THAT ONE OF HIS REASONS FOR DEMANDING "TACTICAL" WEAPONS FOR GERMANY MAY BE BOTH TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT AND PUT GERMANY IN A BETTER BARGAINING POSITION ON REUNIFICATION.

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